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Abstract
In this paper we study an expression for all additive, symmetric and efficient solutions, i.e.,
the set of axioms that traditionally are used to characterize the Shapley value except for the
dummy axiom. Also, we obtain an expression for this kind of solutions by including the self
duality axiom. These expressions allow us to give an alternative formula for the consensus
value, the generalized consensus value and the solidarity solution. Furthermore, we introduce
a new axiom called coalitional independence which replaces the symmetry axiom and use it
to get similar results.
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Since the seminal axiomatic contribution of Shapley in 1953, the variations of his novel
axioms have played a key role in the literature of transferable-utility cooperative games,
mainly trying to understand diﬀerent applications. Most variations substitute his original
axioms either by weaker versions or by diﬀerent axioms that ﬁt certain application. However,
very few papers consider the raw solutions that emerge by taking out one or two of the original
axioms. This paper is one of them; it provides a closed form expression of semivalues without
the dummy axiom. It also proposes a weakening of the symmetry axiom, and provides a
closed form expression of these solutions.
Semivalues without the dummy axiom have applications in problems incompatible with
a subsidy-free scenario. For instance, labor unions require employers to pay some minimum
compensation even if an employee does not work: a waiter receives a minimum salary when
the restaurant is empty; and, in certain countries, workers enjoy unemployment insurance
from the government.
This paper is divided in ﬁve parts. In part 2 we give an alternative proof for the general
formula for semivalues without the dummy axiom. In part 3 we replace symmetry by a
coalition independent axiom. In part 4 we relate the previous results with solutions in the
literature. In part 5 we remark the extension of previous formulas to non-additive semivalues.
All proofs are written in the appendix.
2 Solutions without a dummy axiom
By a game we mean a pair (N,v) where N ⊂ N is a ﬁnite set of players and v : 2N → R is a
real function such that v(∅) = 0. Let G = GN be the set of games with a ﬁxed set of players
N. We consider N ﬁxed and n = |N|. Let (N,z) be the zero game, i.e., the game deﬁned
by z(T) = 0 for every T ⊆ N.
Deﬁnition 1 By a solution in G we mean a continuous function ϕ : G → RN. Let V be the
set of solutions in G.
A solution is a rule to divide the common gain or cost among the players in N. The
requirement of continuity, in the deﬁnition of a solution, is necessary to obtain all of our
results. Also, it is desirable to have a zero payoﬀ for the zero game because in this case no
coalition generates gain or cost.
In this section, we obtain an expression for all additive, symmetric and eﬃcient solutions:
that is, all the axioms that traditionally characterize the Shapley value except the dummy
axiom. A similar, albeit diﬀerent expression of linear, symmetric and eﬃcient semivalues
can be found in the appendix of Ruiz et al. (1998) and Hern´ andez et al. (2007).
Proposition 1 The solution ϕ satisﬁes additivity, symmetry and eﬃciency axioms if and







(n − s)[βsv(S) − βn−sv(N\S)] (1)
1for some n − 1 real numbers {βs}
n−1
s=1.
Proof of this result, and the ones that follow, are given in the Appendix.
We denote by ϕβ the solution ϕ with parameters {βs}
n−1
s=1 when we need to refer to its
parameters. Every additive, symmetric and eﬃcient solution is of the form (1) and for
every set of real numbers {βs}
n−1
s=1 in (1) we get a solution that satisﬁes these three axioms.
Furthermore, notice that for diﬀerent sets of real numbers {βs}
n−1
s=1 we get diﬀerent solutions,
therefore, the dimension of this (aﬃne) subspace of solutions is n−1. Moreover, the Shapley
value corresponds to the numbers βs =
(s−1)!(n−s−1)!
n! , s = 1,...,n − 1.
We may interpret (1) as follows. With respect to an eﬃcient solution, a game v has
the following information: v(N) tells us the total amount to be shared and v(S), S 6= N,
the amount that coalition S claims for itself. So, we start with the egalitarian solution,
i.e., we give
v(N)
n to each player. We keep going with one transference from N\S to S for
each coalition S 6= N,∅: Every player in N\S pays sβsv(S) and every player in S receives
(n−s)βsv(S). Notice that we use the same factor βs for coalitions with equal cardinality s.
At the end, player i has an amount ϕi(v) given by (1).
3 Solutions satisfying the coalitional independence ax-
iom
In this section we replace the symmetry axiom in the previous proposition with a new one
that we call coalitional independence axiom. This axiom looks like the fair ranking axiom
of Chun (1989).
Deﬁnition 2 We say that the two games (N,v) and (N,w) only diﬀer in S if and only if
v(T) = w(T) for every coalition T 6= S.
The coalitional independence axiom requests that the solution changes equally for any
two players in S or any two players in N\S for every two games that only diﬀer in S.
Axiom 1 (Coalitional independence) We say that ϕ satisﬁes the coalitional indepen-
dence axiom if
ϕi(v) − ϕi(w) = ϕj(v) − ϕj(w)
for every two games (N,v) and (N,w) that only diﬀer in S and i, j ∈ S or i, j ∈ N\S.
Remark 1 Notice that additivity and symmetry imply coalitional independence, but additiv-






Clearly ϕ satisﬁes additivity and coalitional independence but not symmetry. Now, suppose
that ϕ is an additive and symmetric solution. Let v,w ∈ G be two games that only diﬀer in
2S, and take either i, j ∈ S or i, j ∈ N\S. Let θ be the permutation of N that interchanges
i and j. Then θ∗(v − w) = v − w, so, ϕ(v − w) = ϕ(θ∗(v − w)) = θ∗ϕ(v − w).
Therefore, ϕi(v − w) = ϕj(v − w). Hence, ϕ satisﬁes coalitional independence.
Proposition 2 The solution ϕ satisﬁes additivity, coalitional independence and eﬃciency







(n − s)[βSv(S) − βN\Sv(N\S)] (2)
for some set of 2n − 2 real numbers {βS}∅6=S N.
We get a similar expression as that of proposition 1, except that now we have one βS for
each non empty coalition S 6= N. Again, every solution that satisﬁes the additive, symmetry
and eﬃciency axioms is of the form (2) and for every set of real numbers {βS}∅6=S N we get a
solution that satisﬁes these axioms. Now, the next corollary includes the self duality axiom
as part of its hypotheses 2. Again, including this axiom roughly halves the dimension of the
space of solutions.
Axiom 2 (Self duality) We say that the solution ϕ is self dual if ϕ(v) = ϕ(v∗) for every
game v ∈ G.
Corollary 1 The solution ϕ satisﬁes additivity, coalitional independence, eﬃciency and self







(n − s)[βSv(S) − βN\Sv(N\S)] (3)
for some set of 2n−1 − 1 real numbers {βS}S⊆N such that βS = βN\S.
We conclude this section with a characterization of the Shapley value, we replace the
symmetry axiom with the coalitional independence axiom.
Proposition 3 The Shapley value is the unique solution that satisﬁes additivity, coalitional
independence, dummy and eﬃciency axioms.
4 Some special cases
In this section we brieﬂy see some special solutions of the form (1) that do not satisfy the
dummy axiom (i.e. diﬀerent from Shapley’s value). A ﬁrst example is the Equal Surplus
solution:





3which we get when we choose β1 = 1
n and βs = 0 for s 6= 1 in (1). Another self dual solution











where βs = 1
s(n−s) in (1).
4.1 The Consensus Value
The convex linear combination (rather than the linear combination) of two solutions of
the form (1) gives another solution of the same form. Moreover, the parameters of the
new solution are just the convex combination of those of the two original solutions. More





In this sense, Ju et al. (2007) prove that the consensus value is the middle point between the



















(s − 1)!(n − s − 1)!
n!
(v(S)−v(N\S))].
In the same way, we could generate an expression for any generalized consensus value, i.e.,
we would only need to replace β1 = 1−θ
n + θ
n(n−1) and βs =
θ(s−1)!(n−s−1)!
n! for s = 2,..,n − 1,
in (1).
4.2 Solidarity value
Nowak and Radzik (1997) introduce the solidarity value. They deﬁne, for any non-empty
coalition T and any game v ∈ G, Av(T) = 1
t
P
k∈T [v(T) − v(T\{k})]. Then, they deﬁne the








They characterized this value with the eﬃciency, additivity, symmetry and A-null player
axioms, so the solidarity value must be a special case of (1). Indeed, if we expand (4) we





Thus, this coeﬃcient corresponds to sβs in (1), and therefore
βs =
(n − s − 1)!(s − 1)!
(s + 1)n!














n − s + 1

.
Observe that the solidarity value is not self dual since βs 6= βn−s.
4.3 Least Square Prenucleolus















This solution is also of the form (1). The corresponding parameters are βs = 1
n2n−2.
Remark 2 Current literature does not say much about non-additive semivalues. This paper
does not explore this topic; however, the non-additive and non-dummy semivalues can be
easily characterized by modifying (1). Indeed, replace the constant βi by any function β∗
i :
GN → R that is symmetric in G. This function is clearly eﬃcient and symmetric. It will be
additive when β∗
i is constant, and by construction the dummy axiom does not hold. Similar
formulas can be given by replacing symmetry by the coalition independence axiom.
5 Appendix
Lemma 1 A solution satisﬁes the additivity axiom if and only if it is linear.
Before we continue with the proofs, we need to deﬁne a game χS for every S ⊆ N,
χS(T) =

1 if T = S
0 otherwise.
Lemma 2 The solution ϕ satisﬁes the additivity and symmetry axioms if and only if there
exist real numbers {βs}n









e βsv(S) for every i ∈ N.
Proof. Let ϕ be an additive and symmetric solution, from Lemma 1, ϕ is linear. Clearly
{χS}S⊂N is a basis for G, and for every game v ∈ G, v =
P









5for every i ∈ N. On the other hand, let U,V ⊆ N be such that |U| = |V |, k ∈ U, l ∈ V
and θ a permutation of N such that θ(U) = V and θ(k) = l. Since θ(χU) = χV then
ϕk(χU) = ϕl(χV) by symmetry. Therefore, βk
U = βl
V if |U| = |V |, k ∈ U, l ∈ V . Similarly,
we can conclude that βk
U = βl








for some constants {βs}n
s=1∪{e βs}
n−1
s=1. The proof in the other direction is straightforward. 








s=1. Since ϕ is eﬃcient, we have that
P
i∈N ϕi(χS) = sβs+(n−s)e βs =
0 for every S   N, and
P
i∈N ϕi(χN) = nβn = 1. Therefore, e βs = − s
n−sβs for s = 1,2,...,n−1
















for some numbers {βs}
n−1









(n − s)(qsv(S) − qn−sv(N\S)).
Lemma 3 The solution ϕ satisﬁes additivity and coalitional independence axioms if and







e βSv(S) for every i ∈ N.
Proof. Note that, for every S, χS and the zero game diﬀer only on S, thus if ϕ is any
linear and coalitional independent solution
ϕi(χS) = ϕj(χS),if i,j ∈ S or if i,j ∈ N \ S.
For every S deﬁne βS := ϕi(S) for any i ∈ S; similarly, for every S 6= N, deﬁne f βS := ϕj(S)











It is straightforward to check the converse. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Keeping the same notation as above, we know that if ϕ is in
addition an eﬃcient solution, then, for every S 6= N
0 = χS(N) =
X
i
ϕi(χS) = sβS + (n − s)f βS;
6thus f βS = − s





























for some numbers {qS}S N. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Assume i ∈ N, then by Proposition 2 there exists a set of numbers







(n − s)[βSv(S) − βN\Sv(N\S)].
For every S 6= N we deﬁne a game ξS as follows
ξS(T) =

0 si T 6= S and T 6= N\S
1 T = S or T = N\S .
Therefore
(n − s)[βN\S − βS] = ϕ(ξ
∗
S) = ϕ(ξS) = (n − s)[βS − βN\S],







(n − s)βS[v(S) − v(N\S)].
It is easy to show that solutions of this kind satisfy the self duality axiom. 
Proof of proposition 3. We leave to the reader to verify that Shapley’s value satisﬁes the
coalitional independence axiom.
Now, let ϕ be a solution that satisﬁes additivity, coalitional independence, dummy and
eﬃciency axioms. Fix a player i and consider coalitions T ⊂ N \{i} but T 6= N \{i}. First
of all, notice that i is a dummy player for χT∪{i} + χT, therefore -using the expression for
coalitional independent solutions from Proposition 3-
0 = ϕi(χT∪{i} + χT) = (n − t − 1) · βT∪{i} − t · βT.
Thus, βT = n−t−1
t βT∪{i} for each T   N\{i}.
From this, it follows that the solution is determined by the single number βN\{1}. More-
over, from
0 = ϕ1(χN + χN\{1}) =
1
n
− (n − 1)βN\{1},
we conclude that the solution is unique. Since the Shapley value satisﬁes these axioms,
ϕ = Sh. 
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